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Napster: Facilitation of Sharing, or Contributory and 
Vicarious Copyright Infringement? 
 
Sue Ann Mota* 
 
INTRODUCTION 
 
From childhood, we are taught to share.  But may we 
share, peer-to-peer, copyrighted music through Napster.com?  
Record companies argue that Napster users are direct 
copyright infringers,1 and that Napster itself is a vicarious and 
contributory copyright infringer.2  The Court of Appeals for the 
Ninth Circuit agreed on February 12, 2001,3 and on March 5, 
2001 Napster was preliminarily enjoined from “engaging in, or 
facilitating others in, copying, downloading, uploading, 
transmitting, or distributing” copyrighted sound recordings.4  
The March 5, 2001 injunction further ordered Napster to 
prevent the downloading, uploading, transmitting, or 
distributing copyrighted sound recordings within three 
business days of receipt of reasonable notice of infringing files.5 
This article will examine the Napster litigation through 
the March 5, 2001 preliminary injunction.  The article will 
conclude with implications for other file-sharing and data 
transmission technologies. 
 
 
 
 
* Professor of Legal Studies, Department of Legal Studies and 
International Business, Bowling Green State University; J.D., University of 
Toledo College of Law, Order of the Coif; M.A. and B.A., Bowling Green State 
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 1. See Brief for Plaintiffs/Appellees at 25, A & M Records, Inc. v. 
Napster, Inc., 239 F.3d 1004 (9th Cir. 2001) (Nos. 00-16401, 00-16403). 
 2. See id. 
 3. See A & M Records, Inc. v. Napster, Inc., 239 F.3d 1004, 1029 (9th Cir. 
2001).  See infra notes 32-68 and accompanying text. 
 4. A & M Records, Inc. v. Napster, Inc., No. C99-05183 MHP, MDL, No. 
C00-1369 MHP, 2001 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 2186, at *3 (N.D. Cal. March 5, 2001).  
See infra notes 68-69 and accompanying text. 
 5. See Napster, 2001 U.S Dist. LEXIS 2186, at *7. 
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A & M RECORDS, INCORPORATED V. NAPSTER, INCORPORATED 
 
Napster, “the brainchild of a college student who wanted to 
facilitate music-swapping by his roommate,”6 began operations 
on June 1, 1999.7  Napster, an Internet start-up, distributes its 
proprietary file sharing software, MusicShare, free at its Web 
site, and users then log on to Napster and share MP3 music 
files with other users.8  Napster users use this peer-to-peer file 
sharing system to upload and download MP3 files without 
payment to Napster, each other, or copyright owners. 
Napster did not obtain licenses to distribute, download, or 
facilitate others to do so.9  Napster claims that it had a 
copyright compliance policy as early as October 1999,10 but 
admits that it did not document or notify users of this policy 
until February 7, 2000.11  Napster is a free service, and 
according to plaintiffs, virtually all Napster users download or 
upload some copyrighted files, according to plaintiffs.12  
According to an expert for the plaintiffs, 87% of Napster files 
exchanged belong to a copyright holder, and over seventy 
percent are copyrighted and owned by the plaintiffs.13 
On December 6, 1999, plaintiffs, eighteen copyright holders 
including A & M Records, MCA Records, Sony Music 
 
 6. A & M Records, Inc. v. Napster, Inc., 114 F. Supp. 2d 896, 902 (N.D. 
Cal. 2000). 
 7. See Spencer E. Ante, Inside Napster, BUSINESS WEEK, Aug. 14, 2000, 
at 113. 
 8. See Napster, 114 F. Supp.2d at 901.  MP3 Expert or Motion Picture 
Group 1, Audio Layer 3, is a standard format to store compressed audio files.  
See id.  MP3 is an algorithm that compresses a digital music file by a ratio of 
approximately 12:1, thereby reducing the size of the file so that it can be more 
easily and quickly copied, transmitted and downloaded over the Internet.  See 
A & M Records, Inc. v. Napster, Inc., 54 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1746, 1747 n.1 
(N.D. Cal. 2000).  See generally Recording Indus. Ass’n. of Am. v. Diamond 
Multimedia Sys., Inc., 180 F.3d 1072, 1073-74 (9th Cir. 1999). 
 9. See Napster, 114 F. Supp. 2d at 903. 
 10. See Napster, 54 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1748.  This policy reads as 
follows: 
Napster will terminate the accounts of users who are repeat 
infringers of the copyrights, or other intellectual property rights, of 
others.  In addition, Napster reserves the right to terminate the 
account of a user upon any single infringement of the rights of others 
in conjunction with use of the Napster service. 
Id. 
 11. See id. 
 12. See Napster, 114 F. Supp. 2d at 902-03. 
 13. Id. at 903. 
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Entertainment, Atlantic Recording Corporation, Capitol 
Records, and other leading manufacturers and distributors of 
sound recordings, filed a complaint against Napster for 
contributory and vicarious copyright infringement.14 Some 
plaintiffs also alleged related violations of the California Civil 
Code15 and unfair competition.16  According to the plaintiffs, 
Napster is an online bazaar devoted to the piracy of music, and 
is created and is operating a haven for music on an 
unprecedented scale.17  For the alleged contributory and 
vicarious copyright infringements, the plaintiffs requested 
damages and profits,18 or statutory damages of $100,000 for 
each work infringed.19  The plaintiffs also requested 
preliminary and permanent injunctions against further 
contributory and vicarious infringements.20 
Napster requested summary adjudication,21 claiming that 
its activities fell within the safe harbor provision of the Digital 
Millennium Copyright Act (DMCA).22  The district court 
declined to grant the motion for summary adjudication, 
however, ruling that Napster did not qualify for the safe harbor 
because it did not transmit, route, or provide connections 
through its service.23  Even if Napster had met these conditions, 
however, the safe harbor provisions require a service provider 
to have a policy to terminate subscribers who are repeat 
 
 14. See Napster, 54 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1746, 1747 n.1 (N.D. Cal. 2000) 
(including Counts I and II of the complaint which cite violations of 17 U.S.C. 
§§ 106, 115, and 501 (1999)); 17 U.S.C. §§ 106, 115 (a), (d), and 501 (a).  See 
infra note 47 and accompanying text (describing contributory copyright 
infringement) and note 46 and accompanying text (describing vicarious 
copyright infringement). 
 15. See Napster, 54 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1747 (describing Count III of the 
complaint which cites California Civil Code § 980 (a) (2)). 
 16. See id. (describing Count IV of the complaint which cites California 
Business and Professions Code § 17200). 
 17. See id. at ¶ 1. 
 18. See 17 U.S.C. § 504(b) (2001). 
 19. See 17 U.S.C. § 504(c) (2001).  At the time the complaint was filed, § 
504 (c)(2)’s limit was $100,000.  It was amended to increase to $150,000 by the 
Digital Theft Deterrence and Copyright Damages Improvement Act of 1999, 
Pub. L. No. 106-160, § 2, 113 Stat. 1774 (1999). 
 20. See 17 U.S.C. § 502(a) (2001) (authorizing injunctions). 
 21. Summary adjudication may be granted under the same standards as 
summary judgment.  Summary judgment shall be granted when there is no 
genuine issue of material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a 
matter of law.  See Napster, 54 U.S.P.Q.2d at 1748. 
 22. See 17 U.S.C. § 512(a) (2001); Napster, 54 U.S.P.Q.2d at 1748-49. 
 23. See 17 U.S.C. § 512(g)(2) (2001); Napster, 54 U.S.P.Q.2d at 1752. 
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infringers.24  Napster did not give users notice of such a written 
policy until two months after this suit was filed.25 
On July 26, 2000, District Court Judge Marilyn Patel held 
a hearing on the plaintiffs’ motion for a preliminary injunction, 
and on that day granted the preliminary injunction and 
ordered Napster to comply with the order by midnight, July 28, 
2000.26  The district court preliminarily enjoined Napster “from 
engaging in, or facilitating others in copying, downloading, 
uploading, transmitting, or distributing plaintiffs’ copyrighted 
musical compositions and sound recordings, protected by either 
federal or state law, without express permission of the rights 
owner.”27  In the district court’s findings of fact, the court found 
that Napster use was likely to reduce CD purchases by college 
students, heavy users of Napster.28  In the findings of law, the 
judge did not allow Napster to expand the fair use doctrine to 
protect its activities.29  On July 28, however, the Court of 
Appeals for the Ninth Circuit stayed the injunction.30 
 
 24. 17 U.S.C. § 512(i) (2001). 
 25. See Napster, 54 U.S.P.Q.D.2d at 1752; supra notes 10-11 and 
accompanying text. 
 26. See Napster, 114 F. Supp.2d at 927 n.32.  The plaintiffs argued that 
they were likely to succeed on the merits, as Napster was liable for 
contributory and vicarious copyright infringement and argued that Napster’s 
defenses were meritless.  The plaintiffs stated that absent an injunction, they 
would suffer substantial and irreparable harm, and an injunction would serve 
the public interest.  Plaintiffs’ Memorandum of Points and Authorities in 
Support of Plaintiffs’ Motion for Preliminary Injunction, A & M Records, Inc. 
v. Napster, Inc. (No. C-99-5183 MHP). 
 27. Id. at 927. 
 28. See id. at 909. 
 29. See id at 901.  The statute provides the following non-exhaustive list 
of fair use factors: 
(1) the purpose and character of the use, including whether such use is 
of a commercial nature or is for nonprofit educational purposes; (2) the 
nature of the copyrighted work; (3) the amount and substantiality of 
the portion used in relation to the copyrighted work as a whole; and (4) 
the effect of the use upon the potential market for or value of the 
copyrighted work. 
17 U.S.C. §107 (2001). 
  Under the first factor, the court found that the purpose and character 
of the use militates against fair use, and the use was not private.  See Napster, 
114 F. Supp. 2d at 912-13.  The nature of the use went against the finding of 
fair use under the second factor.  See id.  Under the third factor, the entire 
copyrighted work was copied.  See id.  The fourth factor also weighed against a 
fair use since CD sales to college students were reduced and barriers to 
plaintiffs’ entry into the market for digital downloading were raised.  See id.  
Thus, a fair use was not present.  See id. 
 30. See id. at 927 n.32.  On July 28, 2000, the plaintiffs posted a bond for 
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On October 11, 2000, five actions against Napster were 
centralized in the district court for the Northern District of 
California.31 
On Feb. 12, 2001, the Court of Appeals for the Ninth 
Circuit held that the recording companies substantially and 
primarily prevailed on appeal, and partially remanded the case 
to the district court to modify the preliminary injunction.32  On 
appeal, the Ninth Circuit reviewed whether the district court 
used appropriate legal standards when issuing the preliminary 
injunction and whether the district court applied the law 
correctly to the underlying issues of the case, or whether “the 
district court got the law right.”33 
Because Napster could not commit vicarious or 
contributory copyright infringement without direct copyright 
infringement by a third party,34 the appeals court stated that 
“[p]laintiffs must satisfy two requirements to present a prima 
facie case of direct infringement: (1) they must show ownership 
of the allegedly infringed material and (2) they must 
demonstrate that the alleged infringers violate at least one 
exclusive right granted to copyright holders.”35  The district 
court concluded that the plaintiffs made a prima facie case of 
direct infringement by Napster users, under 17 U.S.C. § 106,  
and this was not appealed by Napster.36  Napster claimed, 
however, that its users had a fair use defense to direct 
copyright infringement.37  A Napster user’s fair uses included 
sampling, or making temporary copies of a work before 
purchasing it; space-shifting, or accessing a work through 
Napster that the user already owns; and distributing 
recordings by artists who allow users to access the work.38  The 
 
five million dollars to compensate Napster for losses if the injunction was 
reversed or vacated.  See id. 
 31. In re Napster, No. 1369, 2000 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 15493, at *1 (J.P.M.L. 
Oct. 11, 2000) (listing the actions). 
 32. See Napster, Inc., 239 F.3d at 1029. 
 33. Id. at *12.  “Preliminary injunctive relief is available to a party who 
demonstrates either: (1) a combination of probable success on the merits and 
the possibility of irreparable harm; or (2) that serious questions are raised and 
the balance of hardships tips in its favor.”  Id. (citing Prudential Real Estate 
Affiliates, Inc. v. PPR Realty, Inc., 204 F.3d 867, 874 (9th Cir. 2000)). 
 34. See id. at 1013 n.2 (citing Religious Tech. Ctr. v. Net Com On-line 
Communication Serv., Inc., 907 F. Supp. 1361, 1371 (N.D. Cal. 1995)). 
 35. Id. at 1013. 
 36. Id.  See supra notes 12-13 and accompanying text. 
 37. Napster, 239 F.3d at 1014.  See supra note 29. 
 38. Napster, 239 F.3d at 1014.  See generally, Ruth Okediji, Givers, 
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Ninth Circuit stated that the district court correctly 
determined that the plaintiffs would likely prevail in 
establishing that both sampling and space-shifting are not fair 
uses.39  Sampling is a commercial use that adversely affects the 
markets for both audio CD’s and online distribution.40  
Similarly, the district court did not err in finding that the 
plaintiffs would likely prevail in establishing that space-
shifting is not a fair use.41  When a user lists a copy of a 
recording that he or she owns on the Napster system so that 
the recording can be accessed from another location, that 
recoding becomes available to millions of other users.42  Finally, 
permissive distribution of works, along with other 
noninfringing uses of Napster such as chat rooms and message 
boards, were not challenged by the plaintiffs on appeal.  Having 
found no error by the district court on the fair use issue, the 
Ninth Circuit addressed Napster’s secondary liability for its 
users’ direct infringement. 
Contributory copyright infringement occurs when one 
induces, causes, or materially contributes to the infringing 
 
Takers, and Other Kinds of Users: A Fair Use Doctrine for Cyberspace, 53 FLA. 
L. REV. 107 (2001); Wendy M. Pollack, Note, Tuning In: The Future of 
Copyright Protection for Online Music in the Digital Millennium, 68 FORDHAM 
L. REV. 2445 (2000). 
 39. See Napster, 239 F.3d at 1019. 
 40. See id. at 1018. 
 41. See id. at 1019.  The district court did not err in refusing to apply the 
shifting analysis of Sony Corp. of Am. v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 
417, 423 (1984), and Recording Indus. Ass’n. of Am. v. Diamond Multimedia 
Sys., Inc., 180 F.3d 1072, 1079 (9th Cir. 1999).  In Sony, the majority of VCR 
purchasers did not distribute taped television shows, but viewed them at 
home.  In Diamond, the users transferred a copyrighted work from their hard 
drives to portable MP3 players.  Napster, 239 F.3d at 1019.  See generally 
Jayne A. Pemberton, Note, UPDATE: RIAA v. Diamond Multimedia Systems - 
Napster and MP3.com, 7 RICH .J.L. TECH. 1 (Fall 2000) 
<http://www.richmond.edu/jolt/v7il/note3.html>; Stephen W. Webb, Note, 
RIAA v. Diamond Multimedia Systems; The Recording Industry Attempts to 
Slow the MP3 Revolution, Taking Aim at the Jogger Friendly Diamond Rio, 7 
RICH. J.L.& TECH. 5 (Fall 2000) 
<http://www.richmond.edu/jolt/v7il/note2.html>; Elizabeth R. Gosse, Note, 
Recording Industry Association of America v. Diamond Multimedia Systems, 
Inc.: The RIAA Could Not Stop the Rio – MP3 Files and the Audio Home 
Recording Act, 34 U.S.F. L. REV. 575 (2000); Alex Alleman, Note, 
Manifestation of an AHRA Malfunction: The Uncertain Status of MP3 Under 
Recording Industry Association of America v. Diamond Multimedia Systems, 
Inc., 79 TEX. L. REV. 189 (2000); Lisa M. Needham, Comment, A Day in the 
Life of the Digital Music Wars: The RIAA v. Diamond Multimedia, 26 W. 
MITCHELL L. REV. 1135 (2000). 
 42. See Napster, 239 F.3d at 1019. 
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conduct of another, by one who knows or has reason to know of 
the direct infringement.43  According to the Ninth Circuit, the 
district court did not err in finding that Napster both actively 
and constructively knew that its users exchanged copyrighted 
music which was sufficient to impose contributory liability.44  
The Ninth Circuit also ruled that the district court properly 
found that Napster materially contributed to direct 
infringement.45  Thus, according to the Ninth Circuit, the 
plaintiffs demonstrated a likelihood of success on the merits of 
the contributory copyright infringement claim.46 
Vicarious copyright infringement, an outgrowth of 
respondeat superior, extends beyond employment relationships 
to instances where the defendant both has the right and ability 
to supervise the infringing activity, and has a direct financial 
interest in the infringing activities.47  The district court did not 
err in finding that Napster had a direct financial interest in the 
infringing activity.48  The Ninth Circuit also found that Napster 
had the right and ability to supervise its users’ conduct and 
therefore the district court’s conclusion that the plaintiffs 
demonstrated a likelihood of success on the merits of the 
vicarious copyright infringement claim was proper.49 
 
 43. Id.  In other words, contributory infringement occurs when one 
engages in personal conduct that encourages or assists the infringement.  See 
id. 
 44. Id. at 1020.  The district court found actual knowledge because a 
document by a Napster co-founder mentioned the need to remain ignorant of 
users’ real names and IP addresses since they were exchanging pirated music, 
and RIAA informed Napster of more than 12,000 infringement files.  The 
district court found constructive knowledge because Napster executives had 
the following: recording industry experience; intellectual property enforcement 
experience; downloading experience involving copyrighted music; and 
promotion experience of the site listing infringing files.  See id. at 1020 n.5.  
The appeals court did depart from the reasoning of the district court in that 
the district court improperly confined the analysis of knowledge to current 
users and ignored the system’s capabilities.  See id. at 1021. 
 45. See id. at 1022. 
 46. See id.  The district court concluded that Napster users could find and 
download copyrighted music with ease and without the service that Napster 
provides.  Id. at 1022 n.6. 
 47. See id. at 1022. 
 48. Id. at 1023.  Financial benefit exists where the availability of 
infringing material acts as a draw for customers, and Napster’s revenue is 
directly dependent on increases in users.  Id. 
 49. See id. at 1023-24.  Napster’s admission about that improved methods 
of blocking users shows that Napster can and does supervise its service.  
Napster’s own express reservation of rights policy posted on its website shows 
Napster’s right to control its site.  Id. at 1023. 
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Napster then asserted that two statutes, the Audio Home 
Recording Act50 and the Digital Millennium Copyright Act 
(DMCA),51 to protect it and preclude the issuance of a 
preliminary injunction.52  Napster claimed that its users were 
noncommercial users within the meaning of the Audio Home 
Recording Act, so Napster itself could not be secondarily liable.  
The Ninth Circuit, however, agreed with the district court that 
the Audio Home Recording Act does not cover the downloading 
of MP3 files to computer hard drives for two reasons.  
Computers are not digital audio recording devices under the 
statute, and computers do not make digital music recordings 
defined by the statute.53  Napster also argued that the DMCA’s 
safe harbor from copyright infringement suits for Internet 
service providers gives it immunity from suit.54  Plaintiffs 
raised significant questions about the safe harbor which will be 
more fully developed at trial,55 but the district court properly 
concluded that ample evidence showed that the balance of 
hardships weighed in the plaintiffs’ favor.56 
Napster then contended that it had the valid affirmative 
defenses of waiver, implied license, and copyright misuse, 
which had been improperly rejected by the district court.57  
Concerning waiver or abandonment of copyright, which occurs 
only if there is an intent by the copyright owner to surrender 
rights in the copyrighted work, the Ninth Circuit held that the 
district court did not err in finding that the plaintiffs did not 
waive any legal authority to exercise exclusive control over 
 
 50. See 17 U.S.C. § 1008 (2001). 
 51. 17 USC § 512 (2001).   
 52. See Napster, 239 F.3d at 1024. 
 53. Id. 
 54. See id. at 1025. 
 55. See id.  The plaintiffs raised issues of whether Napster is an ISP 
under the statute, whether copyright owners must give an ISP official notice of 
infringing activity, and whether Napster complies with the statute that 
requires an ISP to timely establish a detailed copyright policy.  On the 
DMCA’s safe harbor, the appeals court cited S. Rep. 105-190, at 40 (1998) and 
Charles S. Wright, Actual Versus Legal Control: Reading Vicarious Liability 
for Copyright Infringement Into the Digital Millennium Copyright Act of 1998, 
75 WASH. L. REV. 1005, 1028-30 (2000).  The Wright article advocates reading 
actual control into the DMCA’s safe harbor under 17 USC § 512(c) (1)(B) as 
technology challenges conventional definitions of control, and the sheer 
volume of transactions over a web site makes such control difficult.  See id. at 
1036. 
 56. See Napster, 239 F.3d at 1025. 
 57. See id. at 1025-26. 
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creation and distribution of MP3 files.58  Concerning the 
implied license, which is found only in narrow circumstances 
where one party creates a work at the other’s request and 
intends the other to copy and distribute it, the appellate court 
similarly held that the record supports the conclusion that 
there is no evidence to support this defense either.59  Similarly, 
there was no error in rejecting the affirmative defense of 
copyright misuse, which prohibits a copyright owner from 
securing an exclusive right not granted by the Copyright 
Office.60 
Napster also argued that the preliminary injunction 
violates the First Amendment because it is broader than 
necessary.61  The Ninth Circuit held that the injunction was 
proper.62  The five million dollar bond posted by the plaintiffs 
was not increased on appeal, despite requests by Napster.63  
The court also rejected Napster’s request for a compulsory 
royalty instead of an injunction, as the Copyright Act provides 
various sanctions for infringers, and would force the plaintiffs 
to do business with Napster as well as lose control both over 
their ability to negotiate and to control their intellectual 
property.64 
The Ninth Circuit thus agreed with the district court that 
a preliminary injunction against Napster was not only 
warranted, but required.65  The scope of the preliminary 
injunction needed to be modified on remand, however.66  The 
burden of protecting copyrighted works on Napster should be 
shared by the parties.  The burden should be placed on the 
plaintiffs to provide notice of copyrighted files on Napster 
before Napster has the duty to disable access to the copyrighted 
material; Napster also bears the burden of policing its system.67 
On March 5, 2001 the district court preliminarily enjoined 
Napster from engaging in, or facilitating others in, copying, 
 
 58. See id. at 1026. 
 59. See id. 
 60. See id.  The plaintiffs seek to control the exclusive rights of 
reproduction and distribution, and do not seek to control rights beyond their 
exclusive rights.  See id. at 1027. 
 61. See id. at 1027-28. 
 62. See Napster, 239 F.3d at 1028. 
 63. See id.; supra note 30. 
 64. See Napster, 239 F.3d at 1028-29. 
 65. Id. at 1027. 
 66. See id. 
 67. See id. 
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uploading, transmitting, or distributing copyrighted sound 
recordings.68  When Napster receives reasonable knowledge of 
specific infringing files containing copyrighted recordings, 
Napster has three business days to prevent the files from being 
included in the Napster index, which would prevent access to 
these files.69 
 
CONCLUSION 
 
Napster has been preliminarily enjoined from facilitating 
copyright infringement, and copyright infringement damages 
are pending.  Napster, one of the largest peer-to-peer file-
sharing services, estimated that it had over 75 million users by 
the end of 2000.70  Napster now has three days to block 
copyrighted music after notice is received.71  If a user supplies a 
Counter Notification, Napster will send a copy of that Counter 
Notification to the copyright right’s holder making the 
allegation of infringement.  Napster will restore access to the 
user’s account within 10 to 14 business days thereafter, unless 
during that time Napster’s Designated Copyright Agent 
 
 68. A & M Records, Inc. v. Napster, Inc., No. C99-05183 MHP, MDL, No. 
C00-1369 MHP, U.S. Dist. LEXIS 2186, at *3 (N.D. Cal. Mar. 5, 2001). 
 69. See id at 7.  Plaintiffs may also provide to Napster works in advance of 
release, if there is a substantial likelihood that the work will be infringed on 
the Napster site.  See id. 
 70. See A&M Records, Inc. v. Napster, Inc., 114 F. Supp. 2d 896, 902 (N.D. 
Cal. 2000). 
 71. A notice given by Napster.com to a user who is a former student of 
this author (March 9, 2001) states in pertinent part: 
Notice of Blocked Access!  Please read this entire notice carefully.  If 
you were redirected to this page by the Napster client, the reason is 
because Napster has received an allegation from or on behalf of a 
copyright rights holder under the Digital Millennium Copyright Act 
(“DMCA”).  The allegation is that material that you have made 
available through the Napster service is copyrighted and that your 
making it available infringes the notifier’s copyright.  In response, we 
have blocked you from access to your Napster account.  Your account 
will remain blocked unless you provide us with a completed copy of 
the “Counter Notification” form below to the “Designated Copyright 
Agent,” all as covered by the DMCA law.  In order to submit a 
counter notification, you must certify, under penalty of perjury that 
you have a good faith belief that you were blocked as a result of the 
notifier’s mistake or misidentification of the material you were 
sharing.  This form must, as you will see, include your full real name, 
complete address, your Napster user name (i.e., the user name which 
you were using at the time we received the notice and had to block 
your account), and your consent to being sued in the federal court 
where you reside by the copyright holder. 
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receives notice from the copyright right’s holder that it has filed 
a legal action against the user seeking a court order to restrain 
the user from engaging in illegal activity relating to material 
made available through the Napster service.  This author 
believes that this preliminary injunction, as modified, will help 
prevent copyright infringement, yet will allow the sharing of 
non-protected files.  While Napster and its partner, 
Bertelsmann AG, may stay in business by licensing music for a 
fee to its customers,72 other companies such as Gnutella and 
Freenet still allow file sharing anonymously.73  Servers and 
companies operating offshore are also very difficult to shut 
down.74  Napster has sparked new peer-to-peer applications for 
the PC, and is going to spark a new breed of data transmission, 
and the law is struggling to keep up with these technological 
changes.75  A balance will have to be maintained between the 
free sharing of ideas and public domain materials, and 
intellectual property rights. 
 
 
 72. See Lee Gomes, Judge Starts Process of Silencing Napster, WALL ST. 
J., March 5, 2001, at B6. 
 73. See Dennis K. Berman, With Technology Like This, Who Needs 
Napster?, BUSINESS WEEK, Aug. 17, 2000, at 121. 
 74. See, Lee Gomes, “Open Napster” Clones Feel Industry Heat, WALL ST. 
J., Feb. 23, 2001, at B9. 
 75. E-mail from Lindahl Burkhart,  attorney at Jones, Day, Reavis and 
Pogue, to this author (on file with author). 

